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【专题讨论】再谈假账-会计常见的作假手法解密#95楼 KNM的疑似假账#108楼

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楼主: hdcyng       显示全部楼层   阅读模式

楼主
 楼主| 发表于 25-10-2009 01:59 PM | 显示全部楼层
HowTo Detect Some Early Financial Warnings On Companies Growth

How to detectsome early financial warnings in companies.

A lot ofcompanies like to make corporate announcements during the bull market. We agreethat some of the announcements were genuine, but many corporate proposals weresimply too good to be true.

If we analysefurther, we will notice that the proposals might be way beyond the capabilitiesof the companies.

Sometimes, the management’s projections of salesand profits were far beyond the past history. The capital expenditurerequirements were well above the companies’ borrowing capacities. Besides, thetime required to turn the projects into profits might be too long.

Nevertheless, asa result of the announcements, the stock prices would surge and normally, themain sellers behind might be the key owners.

We have also seensome proposals that turned out to be profitable. The companies did make profits in the first few years. However, thehigh growth in expansion stretched the capabilities of the top management, whomight not have the experience and ability to run big businesses. They mighthave the experience to manage RM100mil turnover businesses. However, when theturnover surged beyond RM1bil per year, they might have problems. Infact, the main concerns to the companies were the top management team whichlacked skills and experience to run big businesses.

We need to be careful ifthere are any changes to the key managers of the companies, auditors or accountingfirms. The keymanagers are referred to the positions like chief executive officers andfinancial controllers. Besides, frequent changes in auditorsprovide serious financial warnings, especially the change from a reputableaudit firm to an unknown one.

How to smell a rat or how to detect some early financialwarnings in companies
Companies willsoon start to report their financial results for the period ended Sept 30. In Malaysia,often good companies will try to announce their results before the deadline ofNov 30. However, if they are having difficulties in providing their financialstatements, normally, we will expect some bad news to be announced. Oneof the possible explanations behind the delay is that the companies need moretime to rectify certain financial problems.

Another potential sign offinancial warning is when the companies venture into unrelated businesses.Previously, we sawmany Bursa Malaysia second board companiesgoing into financial distress in 1997/98 when they departed from their corebusinesses in manufacturing and ventured into property development activities.

We need tounderstand that when the company owners enter into areas that are not theircore competencies, they might not be able to apply the knowledge andexperiences accumulated previously. Instead,they would have to go through the entire learning curve again, which wouldresult in the management taking a lot of time in managing those unrelatedbusinesses.

In suchsituations, investors will need to pay attention and analyse whether those newventures will be able to add value to the shareholders’ wealth. Some companieslike to change their names after venturing into new businesses. Too frequentname changes may also imply that the companies have been shifting their corebusiness focus and directions, which may not be good news to the shareholders.

Litigation is also anotherwarning sign. We needto pay attention to companies that are involved in litigations, which may beeither attributed to the companies being sued or they are suing someone else. These litigations may divert themanagement’s attention from day-to-day business operations. As a result, theymay affect the companies’ performance as well.

One of the commonquestions asked by shareholders during any AGM is the directors’ fees. We needto analyse whether the fees paid are in proportion to the companies’profitability. Sometimes, certain companies make excessive perks for owners aswell as their employees or the lifestyle of the key owners is simply not consistentwith the companies’ profitability.

The above are afew of the more common financial warnings that potential or existingshareholders must pay attention to when analysing the companies for investment.More importantly, we need to remain vigilant at all times and pay attention tothe latest development of the companies.
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发表于 19-2-2010 11:16 PM | 显示全部楼层
07年BORSIG的税"前"盈利是三千六百万EURO (07年德国TAX 38.7%-42%)   1 EURO = RMY4.70
BORSIG也估计08年税"前"盈利六千三百万EURO(08年德国TAX少于38.7%)
是宝又被低估的话, 老板借都借来私有化
hdcyng 发表于 15-6-2007 04:54 PM



    老板还真的借$来私有化了
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发表于 10-3-2010 07:56 PM | 显示全部楼层
老板还真的借$来私有化了
HanTuAh 发表于 19-2-2010 11:16 PM



你頂錯地方了,他們搬家了,你應該頂去那邊

http://investalks.com/
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楼主
 楼主| 发表于 19-1-2011 09:38 PM | 显示全部楼层
大多数投资者聞“假账”而色變,但大家了解假账又有多少呢?
      MEGAN賬目“灌水”高達4億多令吉,同時也無能力攤還逾8億令吉。最终MEGAN除牌,令许多投资者血本无归。曾经叱咤股坛的小蓝筹,有首富参股的假账公司金鹏也已回天乏术。为了让大家更了解假账免触地雷股,我将给假账公司做一些分析,让大家参考。

      大致上,我把做假账的目地分为5种类型:(有些假账公司可能重复在不同的类型组别内)

1。瞒骗股东型
--Transmile,MAS,TRI,China Aviation Oil, ...
这类型非常严重!缺乏政府出手解救的话,一般上必死无疑!他们为了某些原因做假账欺瞒股东。
     例如:中国航油(China Aviation Oil)
它仅做了一个quarter的假账就爆炸了!当它投机石油期货亏九亿新元之前的一个quarter,已面对期货亏损(short 卖空二千万桶在USD38 ,而后油价涨达USD40+)情势所逼为了再赌一把,救回亏损, CEO隐瞒了那个quarter亏损数千万的真相!CEO借得三个月时间,再卖空(short)了五千万桶,期待三个月内油价会回跌。可惜被摩根等等大脚围攻,油价涨达USD55后 -- 它爆仓了!(爆仓就是亏损大于你的帐户中去除保证金后的可用资金)如果先前CEO不报三个月假账,母公司中油不会让它再赌期货,也不会一报亏损就达九亿新元或二十亿马币了。
     其它我国政联公司不方便谈太多,免得被起诉。


2。瞒骗银行型
--MEGAN,COMSA,TALAM,Tat Sang...
这类型主要是用假账向银行骗取大量的贷款,也是非常严重的类型。
主要特怔有:
1.通过账目来提高公司的盈利。(Comsa重估资产,Megan修改折旧率,Talam高沽产业,Tat Sang高沽地皮)
2.长期债务迅速的膨胀。
3.都是好的资金经理避开不买的股项。
4.都是高NTA的股项。
5.都是低P/E的股项。
6.都是股价长期越来越低的股项。


3。瞒骗BURSA型
--Ornapaper,Tat Sang,KBES,PECD...
这类主要是为了上市而夸大账目,严重性则因各股而异。其中Tat Sang是KLSE史上寿命最短的新上市公司。PECD也已除牌。反观Ornapaper的上市假账并不严重,这些年来已经“洗”干净了。巴士公司KBES现在则半死不活。

4。瞒骗炒股型
--KNM,LHH,FARMBEST,UDSCAP,SYF...
这类型是配合炒股才操纵季度业绩,一般上是小case。
除非它们在下一个季度业绩炒完后没有把蓄意多报的盈利空清,而且慢慢出现其它类型的假账。

5。瞒骗买主型
--SBB,COMSA,MMM,HWATAI...
这类型一般上最轻。主要是为了提高卖价!
南方银行在卖给CIMB的议价期间隐瞒了一些呆账。
COMSA换老板的时候虽然旧老板抬高了NTA。但杀伤力最强的还是后来的新老板心术不正,欺骗银行的贷款!
MMM虽然卖不出,但后期账目暴露了当时的假账。Maruichi(后来再上市的Mycron)森州皇室差点成了水鱼,还好当时小股东群起反对!(这个case比较严重些)
HWATAI旧老板RM1.70上市,联合炒家炒上RM206后,RM8块落入新老板手中。新老板接手时,账目没有反映业绩下滑的真相。
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发表于 5-3-2011 05:26 PM | 显示全部楼层
希望大大可以更详细得解释案例咯,期待ing
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发表于 21-2-2012 11:53 AM | 显示全部楼层
没下文了????????
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楼主
 楼主| 发表于 18-5-2012 02:54 AM | 显示全部楼层
没下文了????????
Kevlee 发表于 21-2-2012 11:53 AM

希望大大可以更详细得解释案例咯,期待ing
Everlasting 发表于 5-3-2011 05:26 PM


   
最近看到冷眼鼓励研究红筹股,我就随手找了一间股息高达8%的鞋股来研究。
结果。。。  。。。

首先,看数据!
2010年的
现金          RM139,006,782
存货          RM9,115,952
应收账款    RM87,252,042

2011年的
现金          RM212,196,770
存货          RM7,830,637
应收账款    RM126,922,470
净盈利       RM68,856,080
上市集资    RM34,425,000
股息          RM13,400,000

2011年现金有RM212,196,770扣 - 上市集资RM34,425,000 - 再扣2010年的现金RM139,006,782= RM38,764,988 + 再加回股息RM13,400,000 = RM52,164,988 (这个数目大约是2011年盈运所得的现金,其他数据变动不大所以-省略-)

然后,我们拿两年的应收账款增加的数额来看看!
RM126,922,470 - RM87,252,042 = RM39,670,428 (2011年的应收账款相当不合理,放账天数开始超过90天!)


接下来,来一个理谱的!
我们来看看Stock Turnover Days
<(beginning inventory + ending inventory)/2 > / (Cost of Sales / 365days)
=<(RM9,115,952 + RM7,830,637)/2 > / (RM279,016,658  / 365days)
=<RM16,941,589/2> / RM764,429per days
=RM8,470,794 / RM764,429per days
= 11.08days

发现了问题没有!
平均每11.08天就能卖完手上所有的存货。
这个数据是非常离谱的!除非是博彩公司,这样的数据如何让人相信!





再給你们一个惊人的数据!

Maxwell    11.08days
Kstar          9.2days
XDL           13.8days
Xinquan    15.9days
Msport           8days

马来西亚的同行VOIR要 163days!

~~~~~~~~~~~~

拿15.9天的星泉来做代表.
他们自己生产,然后送到全国各地的2-3千间零售店来销售.
送到销售点就当出货来算.
Raw Material Store, Work-In-Progress, Finish Goods Store, Transportation.
这4个过程只要15.9天也超高效率了!
如果我没记错,Gamuda的创办人,慈善家官有缘亏钱撤离超高效率的星泉!
8天的要如何产鞋呢? 乃人寻味~~
8天产鞋唯一的可能性如下!
1。没有原料货仓-Raw Material Store,原料100%存在供应商那里,而且PVC, 塑胶,皮,布,粘剂等等供应商需要随传随到!
2。没有成品货仓-Finish Goods Store,而且买家就在隔邻。所有成品直接送去隔壁的买家,而且买家当天必须买完所有的鞋子然后自行运送-Transportation!
3。唯一的存货是还在生产部的半制成品-Work-In-Progress!

现实生活中有可能发生这种事吗?
~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. Cash in hand 、 Cash at Bank:
在中国,Cash in hand 是可以达到几个亿。auditor 和banker都是一锅,不会去查。我“听说过”某朋友在中国上班,他们的banker就曾propose 给他老板,为了让贷款继续(和我们不同,中国的贷款限期几个月,最多一年。必须每年重新申请)可以叫中介公司帮我们“搞好报表”。这个是很common的practise,上网就可查到一大堆agent的联系。这个ratio可以参考上证的财务报告(中国公司的cash level都比较高)。

2. Stock:
大部分公司都不做stock-take。我“朋友”以前在中国上班时,附近几百家公司没有一家有做stocktake的。(这是在公司要做stocktake时发现千多个来自不同公司的工人,没有一个曾做过stocktake才知道)。

3.假账:
不用多说,每个人都知道中国没有一家公司不做几套账的。财务道德的观念和外国真不可以相提并论。任何曾参与中国accounts的,或开过公司的,或和中国公司交易过的,都知道。广州一带的台资,港资,连老板(法定人)都是假的。要知道谁是真正的老板,看是谁签支票就对了。

- - - - - - -
明白了以上,再谈谈超低stock holding的因素。
大部分原因都是VAT在搞鬼。
我国没有VAT、GST,就不太明白为什么他们的stock那么低。
比如,中国公司为了提高turnover,就必须要提高sales。sales是必须要付VAT的。那么付了sales的VAT给政府,就必须要match 成本的 VAT(purchase,raw material等)。
(Sales x VAT)- (Cost x VAT) = 就是你要还的VAT 增值税。
现在我们就知道,stock是含VAT的。放在账面越久,代表越慢向政府claim回VAT rebate。既然可以claim rebate,当然是尽快claim啦。这就解释了低stock level主要的理由。(所以别去理什么stock turning了,对他们并不重要)
我们本地就反其道。通常公司不够profit,最容易和最普遍的做法就是adjust stock level。 stock volume或value高了,自然profit也高了。所以malaysia 的 factory 和 retail/trading 的 stock turning都比较高。

__________

如果要分析中国股的报表,基本论的,会死得很惨。

基本论依靠的,主要是财务报表。再分析报表中的种种ratio,figure,和机会。

但如果报表本身都是假的,那么依靠这些信息的,全都会做出错误的判断。Transmile,Megan就是最有名的case。连很多最保守,最小心翼翼的高手都会翻个大跟斗。

要分析中国股,最最重要的是了解公司行业和认识老板。

但以我们马来西亚人有名的天真浪漫感情丰富老实腼腆的态度,和中国千年成精的六亲不认现实主义(连老练精明冷漠油滑的香港人都满是狼狈,五体投地)对比,只能说,自己多多保重,虔诚的去多拜几个神。

_____________

还有一个scenario:

又是VAT

大家都明白了,在中国所有的交易都必须付17%的VAT(除了豁免产品和petty trade)。那么你所有的采购,不理你卖出去了没,都需先付VAT。如你的采购是2亿,那么VAT的payment就是1千7百万!这些要等到你的货(final product)全卖出去后才可以claim回。当中如有失窃,损耗等就是没得claim了。

大家都是生意人,谁会那么笨乖乖的去付那么大的开销呢?要知道很多工厂的margin就那15%-20%。付了VAT那不是严重影响cash flow和profit吗?中国人就是中国人。上有天堂下有苏杭。。。。er。。不对不对,是上有政策下有对策:

你们都听过擦边球吧?就是游走灰色地带。哪,VAT is only applied on actual sales made. 好了,问题解决了。大家都把所有的采购-“延期发票”(Delayed Invoicing). 比如我想买100万的货,我会告诉供应商,货到付款,发票延期。那大家都明白了。货到后,我会付100万prepayment给供应商,那些货就当仍属供应商的(或consignment based)。没有发票我就不需给17万的VAT。等我把这些货制成final product后,before 出货的一天前,才要求供应商开发票。那么就可以省下17万x3个月的利息和风险了,还可以排除掉遗失或损耗的loss。供应商也收到应收款。大家开心。

但你在financial statement 就看不到 stock balance 了。

(哈哈大家学着吧,马来西亚就要implement GST了)

_____________

再加上一个scenario

上面的是比较普遍的practise,是合法的。但90%的公司还会冒另一个险:

走白单(或称白条单,小单)

白单是很流行在工业和贸易领域上。很多去广州买过货的都听过。没听过白单的,令伯就解释给你听:
白单的出现是两个大原因:
1. 出口工业。为了tax incentive 和一些外资工厂的条例限制,很多公司和工厂只能出100%出口(或70%出口)的生意。尤其一些只能用美金结算的。那如果你要用人民币向这类工厂买货,或你的货是内需单(不是出口单),怎办呢?就要求对方开白单了。白单就是正常invoicing以外的单子,不好听的说法,就是假发票。因这类公司的invoicing 是link去tax dept的,开白单就不必给VAT(或其他tax)。但这类采购就无法进账,也就没有stock balance了。
2. 纯粹逃税。为了不想给税,就要求对方开白单。当然一家公司不可能全开白单的,但想想,一个亿的采购中,20%开白单就可以逃3,400,000.00的税!老实说,在中国就是国营公司也一样开的不亦乐乎。万一不幸被逮到,还可以协商协商的。

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楼主
 楼主| 发表于 26-5-2012 06:51 PM | 显示全部楼层
再谈中国假账 -- 转贴

Some interesting statistics, can they lie?:

a) more than 20 China companies listed in Singapore since 2008 have been delisted or suspended, out of 150 odd China companies listed there

b) Nasdaq and NYSE Euronext halted trading in the shares of at least 21 small- and micro-cap Chinese companies in the past year. Five such companies were altogether kicked off of the exchanges.That was after 150 companies listed there since 2007 till 2011. So the odds were very close to the Singapore experience.

c) Since 2010, some 110 China companies have gone public in HKSE, their current prices is 15.8% off their IPO price as of end April 2012. Non- China companies listed in HKSE since 2010 have gained 6.5% over the same period. Statistically, that is "highly significant".

d) Since 2010 some 53 China companies have listed in the US. As of end of April 2012, they are on average down 38% from their IPO price, compared to a 9.9% gain for other IPOs.
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I believe a lot more "action" will be found in the States, where more than 150 China companies have listed there because short selling is allowed, and there are plenty of research firms and hedge funds whose bread and butter is to locate these "inflated" companies, short the hell out of them, expose them, and reap the benefits.  

Some of the scandals in Singapore red chips:

1) China Gaoxian Fibre Fabric Holdings Ltd. The Zhejiang-based maker of polyester yarn said on June 30 2011 that its auditors at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP discovered the company’s bank balance should be less than a tenth of the 1.1 billion yuan ($170 million) it reported in its earnings.

2) In the case of FerroChina Ltd., shareholders lost their entire investment when the steelmaker was forced to delist in March 2010 after being suspended for more than a year. The company, which hired Merrill Lynch & Co. in April 2008 as an adviser to help it be “the world’s largest and most efficient independent galvanized steel manufacturer,” defaulted on loans in October of that year, weeks after reporting quarterly net income had tripled.

3) Other stocks that have been suspended include Sino Techfibre Ltd., which said a fire destroyed its financial records after reporting accounting flaws, and China Sun Bio-Chem Technology Group Co., which said a truck transporting its accounting records was stolen.

4) Fibrechem Technologies. This was one of the best-followed S-chips. The first sign of trouble surfaced when the China-based chemical fibre-maker requested a trading halt on Feb 23 this year 2009. That was the day it failed to release, as scheduled, its fourth-quarter and full-year results. To the dismay of shareholders, the firm's auditors indicated they had difficulty finalising the audit on its trade receivables and cash balances as of the end of December last year. Before the trading halt was imposed, the counter plunged seven cents, or 40 per cent, to 10.5 cents, with 9.68 million shares traded.Meanwhile, founder and chief executive James Zhang resigned from his position as executive chairman.
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5) Beauty China. Since March 2 (2009), cosmetics firm Beauty China has requested three trading halts. The problem centres on founder and chairman Wong Hon Wai who had, unknown to shareholders, pledged all his stock - 137.5 million shares, or 38.57 per cent of the share capital - to obtain credit facilities. Many agree that the financial arrangement he made with his shares is material information investors should have been told about via stock exchange announcements. The shares plunged a stunning 26 cents, or 70.3 per cent, to 11 cents, with about 6.3 million shares traded, when the first trading halt was lifted on March 3. It soon emerged that his stake was being force-sold by the lender on the open market to help repay the loan. In order to fulfil his obligations to the financier, Mr Wong was forced to sell 28.8 million of the mortgaged shares between March 4 and March 6, noted DBS Vickers.

6) Sino-Environment. The waste treatment firm's woes started on March 2 2009 when it requested a trading halt after its full-year results. It must have seemed like a recurring nightmare to some investors, given the similarity to Beauty China's problems. Sino-Environment chairman Sun Jiangrong had pledged his entire 56.3 per cent stake or 190.8 million shares, along with other assets, to hedge funds to secure a $120 million loan. As he had difficulties repaying the loan, the forced sale of the pledged shares was triggered. The hedge funds had threatened to sell the shares on the open market. That would cause the control of the company to change hands. It also might plunge the company into a financial crisis, as it would have had to make immediate repayment on a $149 million bond issue - triggered by the change of ownership. Trading was suspended from March 6 and resumed on March 12. After the week-long trading suspension, Sino-Environment plunged 73 per cent to eight cents on a hefty volume of 47.4 million shares. The counter closed at 13.5 cent.

7) Oriental Century. On March 9 2009, education firm Oriental Century - in which local group Raffles Education had invested $30.2 million for a 29.9 per cent stake - called for a trading halt. It later shocked investors by disclosing that founder and chief executive Wang Yuean had said he 'inflated sales and cash balances' over the years and had diverted unspecified sums to an interested party. He also claimed that he devised fictitious accounting to mislead management and auditors into believing the firm had a cash hoard of 234 million yuan.
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Trust The Auditors

Trust the auditors? They don't even trust themselves. A small sampling of recent shame for some top auditors is below. The scams perpetrated and slipped past auditors run the gamut from the mundane, such as improper recognition of revenue, to the incredible, such as hiding massive amounts of off-balance-sheet liabilities or falsifying billions of dollars of cash. Surely, we can trust the auditors what, they are big names. Well, lets look at the big auditors responsible for some big mess:

Arthur Andersen (now defunct): Enron, WorldCom, Nicor, Global Crossing
Ernst & Young: Lehman Brothers, Anglo Irish Bank, HealthSouth
KPMG: Allied Capital, Peregrine Systems, ImClone, Xerox
Deloitte: Nortel, Royal Ahold, Reliant Energy
PwC: Satyam Computer Services, AIG, Tyco
Grant Thorton: Parmalat

Not All Are Rascals

If there are even 20% bad hats, there are still 80% decent companies, assuming all not found to be in breach are really genuine good operators. So, what should they do now that their shares trade at 1x, 2x, 3x PER?

1) Raise dividends to 50% of profits, and make that a company policy. Many will come out with 101 reasons not to do this, you may want to really ask why. Is a company's share price more important than any other issues?

2) Privatise and relist in HK. In 2007, Want Want Holdings, a food and beverage group which makes the popular rice crackers, delisted from the SGX and relisted in Hong Kong in search of better valuations. It is now trading with a PE of over 20x times there, compared with 10 to 15 times in Singapore. So, XDL may have a strong case for moving with this strategy.

If you have invested in a China company listed in Singapore or Malaysia, there is very little you can do after you have asked them to raise dividend. You then have to play the waiting game. I think there are bigger and better fishes to fry while you lock up your capital on something that may take a long time, or worse, turns out to be one of 20% which fell foul of the law later on.
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发表于 13-6-2012 01:49 AM | 显示全部楼层
大开眼界!谢谢分享!
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发表于 13-6-2012 02:32 PM | 显示全部楼层
谢谢分享我现在就是做中国的帐的。他们出钱很难。要还给分行都要一大堆文件,搞到钱欠超过一年了。
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发表于 20-6-2012 05:08 AM | 显示全部楼层
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发表于 25-7-2012 11:51 PM | 显示全部楼层
谢谢大大分享,让我顿时耳目一新,期待大大继续分享
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发表于 3-12-2013 02:07 PM | 显示全部楼层
很就没看到那么经典著作!!!!
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发表于 3-12-2013 03:10 PM | 显示全部楼层
如果这世上有最~最~最~最~最~最~最~“真”的账的话,那将会是一条很细~细~细~细~细~细~细~的“直”线。。。
而那些不能站在那条线上的就是“假”账的话,那问题只在于您是在线的左边还是右边?
本帖最后由 50912cmea 于 3-12-2013 03:14 PM 编辑

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发表于 3-12-2013 03:38 PM | 显示全部楼层
中国的假账技术多是跟美国学的. 青出于蓝.
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发表于 5-12-2013 04:45 PM | 显示全部楼层
哇,受教了
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